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Chapter 1
Introduction
“I always feel like somebody’s watching me... and I have no privacy” –
Rockwell, Somebody’s Watching Me, Motown, 1984.
Mobile computing is pervasive today. There is a multitude of mobile devices available
for users: to help with their work when they travel and to entertain them everywhere,
etc. The mobile computers range from full-fledged laptops with the processing power
of tabletops, to mobile phones (or smartphones), and even to mp3 players. A press
release [101] of a survey reported that 53 % of US-based adults using computers, use
either a notebook or a tablet PC, thus, making mobile PC users now a majority in the US.
Unfortunately, the privacy tradeoffs that these devices introduce are also pervasive.
These devices have many helpful features that improve the usability of network access.
For example, they automatically search for available printer services and access points.
However, many features that users have learned to expect have implications for the
privacy of these users.
In this thesis, we focus on the privacy of mobile computer users. We present a
systematic analysis of information leaks from mobile computer systems, and show how
the privacy of the user is violated by leaks from all layers of the protocol stack. We
present practical privacy enhancing technologies to mitigate these risks to privacy. First
of all, however, we should consider briefly how we understand privacy.
The focus of privacy in this thesis is from the viewpoint of information flow control
and the right to be left alone. Two famous quotes will serve as a starting point here:
“[Privacy is] the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others” [139]
And when speaking of humankind in general
“modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy,
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted
by mere bodily injury” [137]
To put the quotes in their right context, the authors of these quotes are discussing
legal mechanisms needed to protect privacy. The second quote explains what can happen
when the right to be left alone is violated. To further clarify what we mean by the
concepts, we give an example of the life of the author during the writing of this thesis.
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“The author uses two major credit cards, which he usually keeps in his wallet in the
left pocket of his pants.”
Now, the above sentence is an exercise in information flow control where the author
voluntarily divulges personal information. Now that this information is public, the author
can no longer control who uses this information and for what purposes. Neverthless the
author did not divulge the identification numbers, the expiration dates or the security
codes of the credit cards. Hence, information flow control was exercised.
Credit card details offer a very convenient way to, for example, shop for books on the
Internet. The online bookstore needs only some more personal information, such as, the
name of the owner of the credit card and the billing and shipping addresses. Giving these
details to the online store introduces privacy risks, and is therefore a tradeoff between
convenience and privacy. First of all, if we limit ourselves to what is exposed legally,
the credit card company gets to know that the user is buying books online. The online
bookstore also receives explicit information who is buying and what, and can use this
information for direct marketing or recommendations. This might already violate the
right to be left alone, since some users might not like the exposure to directed marketing
based on their buying history.
Having said this it should be pointed out that the above discussion of privacy is
extremely narrow, but sufficient for the purposes of this thesis. For a more detailed
coverage of privacy violations in the context of US legalization and court cases, we refer
the reader to Daniel J. Solove’s “Taxonomy of Privacy” [127]. The concepts already
presented, information flow control and the right to be left alone, are all important for
understanding why this research was done. The concepts to be introduced next, however,
are essential for understanding how privacy can be protected using privacy enhancing
technologies.
Confidentiality of Communication Content The concept of confidentiality of com-
munication content is rather self-explanatory; the problem is to protect communication
data, for example, the voice in a phone conversation or the body of an email message.
Confidentiality of communication content and the right to privacy are commonly
associated concepts, and in the context of computer communication are often considered
to merely mean data encryption. Good examples of this line of thinking are the Wired
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol [73], and a classic privacy book “Privacy on the Line:
The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption“ [41]. WEP is the name of the first WLAN
authentication and encryption protocol, while the book mostly discusses the importance
of using encryption technologies to protect privacy online. Next, we introduce an equally
important concept related to confidentiality of communication.
Confidentiality of Communication Participants Confidentiality of communication
participants means concealing the identities of the involved parties. We refer to this
concept also as identity privacy. In practice, this kind of confidentiality is achieved
with pseudonymity or anonymity. In short, pseudonymity means that, for example,
a person has an identifier that cannot be directly attributed to that person. Whereas
anonymity means that the person cannot be identified within an anonymity set. For
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example, consider Alcoholics Anonymous (AA); it is common knowledge1 that in AA
meetings people introduce themselves by stating, for example, ”I’m James, and I’m an
alcoholic.” James may or may not be a real name, but it is in fact a pseudonym for the
person, and thus, the person can be identified in the context of AA meetings, at least.
Thus, in exact terms, the person is not anonymous. For a more complete treatment of
related terminology, we refer the reader to “Anonymity, Unlinkability, Undetectability,
Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity Management – A Consolidated Proposal
for Terminology” by Pfitzmann and Hansen [114].
The reason why both confidentiality of communication content and communication
participants are equally important in privacy protection is neatly summarized in the
following quote from a US Supreme Court Justice:
“The evil incident to invasion of privacy of the telephone is far greater
than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone
line is tapped, the privacy of persons at both ends of the line is invaded,
and all conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper,
confidential and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one
man’s telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other
person whom he may call or who may call him. As a means of espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny
and oppression when compared to wire-tapping.” – Justice Louis Brandeis,
dissenting opinion in Olmstead vs. United States (277 US 438, 1928, pp.
475–476), cited from a secondary source [41].
Confidentiality of Location The last privacy concept to be introduced is about
protecting or hiding the location of the communicating party. Providing location privacy
does not necessarily require protection of the confidentiality of communication content
or the participants. This means that we may know in detail who is talking to whom and
the content of their communication, but not their physical or actual network location.
However, many anonymity systems provide also location privacy while providing sender
and receiver anonymity. Location privacy can be provided with different granularities,
for example, locally, on the level of access point usage, on the level of network access
(network prefix), or by the country from which the user currently is contacting the
network. Naturally, finer or coarser-grained granularities can also be defined.
As a concrete example of location privacy protection let us consider GSM networks.
Roughly speaking, the GSM number consists of the country code, operator code and
finally the number of the particular subscription. Thus, an outside observer by looking at
the subscriber’s number can identify where the subscription was bought, but not much
more. The GSM network operator, however, knows all the time where the user resides
because of the access points near the mobile phone. GSM networks fail to provide
complete location privacy against outside observers, too. The dial tone is different in
many countries, which already gives a clue where the user might reside. Furthermore,
1as depicted in popular tv series and movies
17
when the mobile phone is switched off and somebody tries to call the user, the caller
hears recorded message from the operator along the lines of “the number you have tried
to reach..” This message is usually given in different languages depending on the country,
and thus, gives a good hint about the country the user resides in at the moment. Maybe
somebody wants to visit a person’s house when the person is not present. Maybe the
other person wants to be reachable from the same number, but not want to reveal the fact
that he or she has left the country.
1.1 Problem Statement
The research problem was two-fold:
1. What are the privacy tradeoffs that modern mobile computer usage introduces?
2. How can we mitigate or prevent the adverse privacy effects of using mobile
computers?
One of the chosen key limitations or requirements was to design mechanisms that
do not alter the user experience or otherwise alter it minimally, in order to provide
acceptability for the chosen approach. Another consideration in respect of that is
deployability. In addition to the above requirement for ease of deployment, other
considerations were needed. We wanted to minimize the changes to existing standards or
protocols and minimize the involvement of other hosts or infrastructure. In other words,
the user does not need to trust the network or any infrastructure other than the operating
system and the user’s device. In particular, we investigated how privacy can be improved
by only modifying either a single host, or two hosts, or a host and an access point.
The method for the research was constructive. Given a research problem, we
investigated possible solutions to solve a particular problem while keeping in mind
the key limitations and requirements. When we conceived a solution candidate, we
started implementing it in software. During the implementation, we found limitations or
different views on the problem, and refined the original solution or redesigned it from
scratch. In the latter case, we then started to implement the software again. Finally, the
research prototypes were tested in wireless research platforms.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis belongs to the field of systems security and privacy, and to the subfield of
privacy enhancing technologies, and this section succinctly summarizes the contributions
of the publications included in this thesis. In Chapter 3, we discuss the contributions
and their limitations further, and contrast them to the most significant and recent related
work.
• Publication I shows how a mobility management protocol integrated with IPsec
can be used to provide privacy for the mobile hosts. The approach is generalizable,
and can therefore be integrated with other protocols, such as SSH or TLS.
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• Publication II presents a systematic analysis of privacy leaks from mobile
computers. We propose a system based on network location awareness to prevent
these leaks.
• Publication III presents how to mitigate privacy leaks by traffic isolation in a
networked mobile computer system.
• Publication IV presents how to modify access-point discovery to preserve privacy
in IEEE 802.11 with minimal changes to the standard protocol. We show that the
modifications do not affect the user experience or security of IEEE 802.11.
1.3 Author’s Contributions
• Publication I. The author was the lead architect of the project, and the original
idea for the problem setting was his. The second author implemented the system
under the author’s close guidance.
• Publication II. The author of this thesis shared similar ideas for a project with
the first author of Publication II. The author implemented parts of the system
presented and did all the experiments for the results presented in the paper.
• Publication III. The author was the lead architect of the project, and the original
idea for the problem setting was his. Based on the author’s initial draft of
the publication and rudimentary scripts, the second author of Publication III
implemented the system under the author’s close guidance.
• Publication IV. The author of this thesis was the lead architect of the project, and
the original idea for the problem setting was his.
The only exception being Publication II, the author of this thesis was the only person
responsible for formulating the research problems, and for the outcome of the projects.
However, it is obvious that the author of this thesis owes a great debt to the group of
excellent seniors and students who are joint authors of the publications. The seniors
were crucial for staying on the right track in the work, whereas the Master’s students did
most of the concrete implementation work with the help and guidance of the author.
1.4 Structure of this Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Background on relevant related work on
privacy enhancing technologies is given in Chapter 2. The contributions of the thesis are
discussed in Chapter 3, and the conclusions are in Chapter 4. The published contributions
of this thesis are presented in the four individual chapters: “Privacy Management for
Secure Mobility” in Publication I, “Chattering Laptops” in Publication II, “Protecting
Privacy with Protocol Stack Virtualization” in Publication III and “Privacy-Preserving
802.11 Access-Point Discovery” in Publication IV.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents the background on privacy enhancing technologies. We have
limited ourselves to work that is essential for understanding the field of the thesis: how it
came about and where it is today. More specific comparison with other related domains
is given in the respective related work sections of the published articles. We also discuss
some related work that was omitted in the publications because of space limitations, and
new related work published after the author’s publications.
The chapter is organized as follows. We start with the basics of cryptography and
move from them to the privacy-preserving and anonymity systems that use them. We
give the background on cryptographic authentication and key exchange protocols, their
identity privacy issues, and privacy protection mechanisms in Section 2.1. What follows
after that in Section 2.2 is a discussion on anonymity systems and privacy on the Internet:
infrastructure-based solutions for providing privacy and research on their limitations,
and how real-world privacy-preserving systems work. Finally, we discuss privacy in
wireless networks and mobile systems in Section 2.3, which provides the fundamental
background for the contributions presented in this thesis.
Many privacy enhancing technologies, however, such as anonymous payment systems
[27,30], privacy-preserving data-mining [136], private information retrieval [110] are
considered to be beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.1 Cryptographic Protocols and Privacy Protection
Protecting the confidentiality of content can be done with cryptographic protocols. In
this section, therefore, we review some basic cryptographic building blocks for protocols,
introduce elementary authentication and key establishment protocols, and then proceed
with practical protocols used on the Internet. The emphasis in this section is on protocols
and mechanisms that provide identity privacy with authentication and key establishment.
These protocols are mostly related to the contributions presented in Publications I and IV,
and provide background on identity leaks in the cryptographic protocols presented in
Publication II.
2.1.1 Cryptographic Building Blocks and Elementary Protocols
Secret Key Cryptography Cryptographic algorithms that use a shared key belong to
the family of secret key or symmetric key cryptography. The crucial point in symmetric
key cryptography is that the secrecy of the protected data should be dependent on the
key. If the attacker knows the algorithm and receives plaintext and encrypted data, the
encrypted data still remains protected provided the key is kept secret. This also highlights
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one of the fundamental problems of symmetric key cryptography called key management:
how to share the secret? Today, symmetric key cryptography is an important building
block for many systems that may also use public key cryptography, as is explained later.
The simplest and most secure form of a symmetric key encryption is the one time
pad. With a one time pad, the key must be used only once to encrypt the plaintext.
The key also needs to be at least the length of the plaintext. This kind of construct has
been proven to have perfect secrecy, but is unfortunately highly impractical for most
applications. More practical symmetric key algorithms are divided into block ciphers
and stream ciphers.
Today, the most important block cipher is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[109]. It can use variable key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits, and takes input and
produces output in blocks of 128 bits. As of today, there are no known practical attacks
or even theoretically feasible attacks against AES.
Another important building block is the cryptographic hash function. A cryptographic
hash function can take an arbitrary length of input and produce a fixed length digest or
hash as a result. The important part is that the function must be one-way; an attacker
should not be able to deduce the input from the result. An important building block
for practical protocols that use both symmetric key cryptography and cryptographic
hash-functions is the keyed-hash based message authentication code (HMAC) [94]. The
purpose of the HMAC is to provide integrity for a given message, and it can only be
verified if the authenticator has the shared secret key.
Public Key Cryptography We mentioned above that symmetric key cryptography has
a fundamental problem related to key management: the distribution of keys. To address
this problem, Merkle [100] invented the public key distribution system, today also
known as asymmetric key cryptography. Due to the review process of Communications
of the ACM, Merkle’s earlier submission was published later than Whitfield Diffie’s and
Mark Hellman’s article titled “New directions in cryptography” [40]. Although later the
invention of public key distribution systems has been attributed to Merkle. Despite this,
the world now knows the process of exchanging keying material as the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. In the abstract form, the idea is simple: each peer owns a public and
private key pair that have a mathematical relation. The private key is kept secret and the
public key is published. The public key is used to encrypt data that can only be decrypted
with the corresponding private key.
The first practical proposal for public key cryptography was the Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman algorithm, today known simply as RSA [121]. The algorithm uses modular
arithmetic and relies on the assumption that factoring prime numbers is a hard problem.
The private key is a combination of positive integers (d, n) and the public key is a
combination of positive integers (e, n), where n is the product of two primes p and
q, and d is chosen relative to p and q. Finally, e is computed from p, q and d to be
the “multiplicative inverse” of d. The security of RSA and public key encryption is
computational: the public key is always mathematically related to the private key. The
RSA algorithm also presents a method for digital signatures. In contrast to using the
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public key for encrypting the data, a user uses the private key. The resulted encryption is
the digital signature, which can be verified using the public key.
We have now briefly introduced some of the most important building blocks of
modern cryptographic protocols. In practice, real-world protocols are usually hybrid
cryptosystems: they use both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. We give
examples of these hybrid cryptosystems and their relation to privacy protection below.
Elementary Protocols In this section, we discuss two important elementary protocols
related to the topic of this thesis. The protocol specifications are abstract. To implement
these protocols in real systems, many details that are not discussed in the specifications,
need to be considered. We discuss the two-pass entity authentication protocol specified
in the ISO/IEC 9798-4 standard [77] and the STS [42] protocol for authentication and
authenticated key exchanges. These protocols are used between two hypothetical users,
Alice and Bob, as follows.
The ISO two-pass protocol uses only a cryptographic hash function and a
pseudorandom number called nonce. The pseudorandom number needs to be chosen
carefully, and is never to be used again in order to maintain the liveness of the protocol,
that is, prevent replay attacks. We now assume that Alice wants to prove her identity,
that is, authenticate to Bob. A successful run of the protocol goes as follows:
1. Bob generates the nonce RBob and sends it to Alice.
2. Alice generates a keyed cryptographic hash of [RBob and concatenation of the
name Bob] and sends it to Bob.
3. When Bob receives Alice’s message, he calculates the function and if it matches
with what Alice has sent, Alice has successfully proven that she knows the shared
key and has thus authenticated herself to Bob.
The protocol can be extended for mutual authentication by adding a third pass. We
also note that, by executing the protocol, Bob knows that the authenticated user is Alice
if, and only if, the key is not shared with other users. Thus, the protocol can be used as a
group authentication protocol by sharing the key with multiple users, but then it does not
identify individual users.
A public key based authentication and key exchange protocol called STS [42]
was published in 1992. The publication mentions many desirable characteristics for a
protocol, such as perfect forward secrecy, direct authentication and no timestamps. STS
achieves all these properties with the following construction:
1. Alice generates a random number x and sends the exponential αx to Bob.
2. Bob generates a random number y and uses it with Alice’s exponential to compute
the keyK = αxy
3. Bob computes αy, signs both αx and αy and encrypts the signature using the key
K, and sends all these to Alice.
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4. Alice computesK, decrypts Bob’s ciphertext and verifies Bob’s signature using
Bob’s public key.
5. Alice sends the corresponding ciphertext encrypted with the keyK to Bob. The
ciphertext includes the exponentials signed with her key.
6. Bob decrypts the ciphertext Alice sent and verifies Alice’s signature.
Alice and Bob have now mutually authenticated themselves and share a secret K,
which can be used to encrypt further communication between the peers. For the above
protocol to be secure, Alice needs to know Bob’s public key beforehand and vice
versa. The public key needs not be known, if the protocol is modified to use public key
certificates, which consequently assumes a trusted third party as a certificate authority.
The STS protocol can be used to build hybrid cryptosystems as discussed above, and
many modern implemented cryptographic protocols have design choices similar to STS,
but add more features, for example, denial of service resistance.
2.1.2 Cryptographic Protocols and Identity Protection
It is prudent engineering practice [3] for cryptographic protocols that a name for the
authenticating principal is given during the process of authentication:
“If the identity of a principal is essential to the meaning of a message, it is
prudent to mention the principal’s name explicitly in the message.” [3]
This practice is heeded in many protocols, but unfortunately, by sending the names
of the principals and usually the certificates in plaintext, the protocols reveal the identity
of the principals to even passive observers. This section presents protocols that are
designed to protect the identity of the authentication participants, in addition to providing
confidentiality of content.
The Security Architecture for Internet Protocol (IPsec) [86] working group in
the IETF has inspired many authentication and key exchange protocols that provide
identity protection. The earliest is the SKEME [93] protocol. SKEME provides identity
protection against observers not participating in the protocol by encrypting the identity
of the initiator with the responders public key. Thus, the initiator needs to reveal its
identity to potential responders first. The IETF designed the IKE protocol [64], which
provides identity protection in the main mode similar to SKEME, but unfortunately uses
many roundtrips. The designers of Just Fast Keying (JFK) [6, 7] designed two protocols,
JFKi and JFKr, that take two round-trips and provide the same level of denial of service
protection. JFKi provides identity protection for the initiator against active attacks,
while the JFKr provides identity protection for the responder and protects both parties’
identities against passive observers. Today IKE specification has been made obsolete by
IKEv2 [83], but still the initiator has to prove its identity first. Many protocols, however,
do not provide identity protection at all.
As a side note, the IPsec architecture has always been surrounded with controversy.
Encrypting the packet payload at the IP layer was seen as too drastic, and therefore the
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IETF needed to specify the IP Authentication Header (AH) [84], which does not provide
confidentiality for the content, but only integrity. This could have also been established
using the null encryption mode with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [85], but the
IETF opted to specify a header for the sole purpose of authentication. On the other hand,
AH does protect also the headers of the IP packet.
Independent of IPsec related work, Abadi proposed two protocols for private
authentication that protect the identities of both parties, and later formally proved the
privacy properties [1, 2]. One of the important notes Abadi makes is that the used public
key encryption protocol used needs to be “which-key concealing” or “key-private” [18].
This property guarantees that, if the attacker sees the ciphertext, he or she cannot tell
which specific key, out of a set of known public keys, was used to create the specific
ciphertext.
There are also special protocols designed to limit the exposure of identity in specific
contexts. Secret handshake protocols [9, 17] provide a way to authenticate membership
in a group and role in it, while a third-party observing the exchange does not learn
anything new (including whether the users doing the handshake belong to the same
group, the identities of the groups or the roles of the users). However, these protocols
have been asymmetric so far, in the sense that it is possible for a user belonging to a
group to learn whether another user belongs to the same group and not reveal anything
of herself by aborting the protocol at the appropriate time. Other schemes of interest are
anonymous credentials [25, 28] for authorizing pseudonyms to access a system, short
group signatures [21] for hiding who in a group signed a message, and secret sets [102]
for providing sets where anybody can test for their own membership, but only the creator
of the set can test another party’s membership in the group she created.
2.2 Anonymity Systems and Privacy on the Internet
In this section, we review influential literature on anonymity systems and privacy on
the Internet, and after introducing the fundamental concepts, we will focus on real-
world deployed systems. Some of the cryptographic building blocks presented earlier
in Section 2.1 are used to build anonymity systems and are also used to protect privacy
on the Internet. We briefly discuss the limitations of anonymity systems and end the
discussion with how privacy protection mechanisms fail in practice.
Anonymity Systems Privacy enhancing technology research can be said to have
started with Chaum’s seminal paper on network mixes [26]. The article published
in Communications of the ACM has been inspiring researchers for over two decades.
Chaum’s work falls in the realm of infrastructure-based approaches for privacy, or
so called anonymity systems. Anonymity systems can generally be categorized as
low-latency or high-latency. The systems can be further categorized by their type, for
example, as mixes [26], onion routing [56, 133], dc-nets [29] or by the infrastructure
support they require: a single server or remailer, multiple servers or peer-to-peer systems.
We start our review of anonymity systems with the simplest form of infrastructure
support: a single server in the hands of a trusted third party. The single server acts, for
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example, as an email remailer. Users send emails to the server including information
on the final recipient, and the remailer assigns pseudonyms for both parties to allow
subsequent communication. To enhance the system, the traffic to the server can be
protected using encryption, such as PGP. However, in addition to the problem that the
server needs to be trusted, the architecture is brittle, as the story of the famous Finnish
anonymous remailer anon.penet.fi demonstrates [68]. In 1995 and 1996, the Church
of Scientology wanted to find out who were behind some pseudonyms relayed by the
anon.penet.fi server. These issues finally led to the shutdown of the system, since it could
not guarantee the privacy of their user because of explicit real address and pseudonym
mappings.
A more advanced design using multiple servers as a cascade was proposed by Chaum
already in 1981 [26] as noted above. The mix network provides sender and receiver
anonymity using public key cryptography, where the users have digital pseudonyms
denoted by their public key. The mix(es) provide anonymity by introducing bitwise
unlinkability: the input to the mix cannot be correlated to the output of the mix. Chaum
also proposed a way to arrange the mixes into a network and the use of dummy traffic to
further complicate traffic analysis. As the mix network relies on public key cryptography,
it is computationally secure. In 1988, Chaum proposed the dining cryptographers
network (dc-net) that, in contrast to mixes, provides information theoretic security, but is
unfortunately not very practical (and never deployed in any form) due to the amount of
messages it needs in every round [29]. Furthermore, despite its information theoretic
security, dc-net is also vulnerable to many traffic analysis attacks, as discussed later.
Perhaps the most important anonymity system that has been developed from Chaum’s
mix nets is onion routing [55, 56, 132, 133]. Whereas the original mix design can be
understood as a packet anonymizer, the onion routing system provides the equivalent of
circuit switching for mixes. The anonymity of onion routing is established by distributed
trust: the clients contact the onion router network that is build as an overlay on the
Internet, and hide their path by layers of encryption. As a result the onion router was
a success and in 1999 the network served more than one million Web connections per
month in twenty countries [55]. The onion routing project has been developed further,
and the current de facto way of achieving sender and receiver anonymity on the Internet
is the second-generation onion router succinctly known as Tor [44]. The Tor network is
currently estimated to have several hundred thousand users and over a thousand active
volunteer servers relaying the traffic [45]. Although the low-latency network is primarily
used for Web browsing, it can be used for accessing a number of different connection-
oriented services, such as IRC or SSH. One interesting feature that onion routing (and
Tor) provide is the hidden server [133]. A user can set up a server (SSH, web, etc.)
that has a name as used in the DNS system to resolve IP addresses. The difference is
that this hidden server name is resolvable only in the onion routing system, and the
IP address is thus hidden from its users. A hidden server establishes an anonymous
connection to a rendezvous point in the onion routing network, and a client that wishes
to contact the server establishes another anonymous connection via the rendezvous point.
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Conceptually, this rendezvous mechanism could be seen as the anonymous equivalent of
a Mobile IP home agent or a SIP relay server.
There are also many other designs for providing anonymity on the Internet. Among
the most succesful ones were the Crowds [118, 119], designed for solely providing
privacy for Web browsing, and the Freenet peer-to-peer network [31, 32] for anonymous
file storage.
Limits of Anonymity Systems and Privacy The privacy that anonymity systems can
provide is limited at least by the anonymity set [131]. In other words, anonymity is
about hiding in the crowds. Therefore, usability is also important for an anonymity
system. Unless the system can attract users there will be no crowds to hide in [43]. The
anonymity a system provides can also be measured with entropy [39, 125]. There are a
number of attacks, countermeasures and their analysis [15,97,105,111,117] documented
in the literature on anonymity systems. However, in the end, it seems that long-term
communication cannot be anonymous. This is shown by the results of passive logging
attacks called predecessor, intersection and disclosure.
The predecessor attack was first introduced against Crowds [118], and later a related
attack against onion routing was analyzed [132]. However, Wright et al. generalized
the attack to work against all known anonymity protocols (some introduced above) and
showed upper bounds for how long these protocols can maintain anonymity [144]. Later,
Wright et al. improved their analysis by removing some of their previous simplifying
assumptions and in simulations, they also showed that, in practice, the anonymity of real
systems is worse than the theoretical upper bounds [145–147]. The predecessor attack
can be established when the attacker controls some nodes in the anonymous system.
The passive attacker observes path reformations where identifiable streams recur from
possible initiators, and uses this information to deduce the identity of the users.
Another attack that sets limits for the anonymity provided by anonymity systems is
the disclosure attack. The attacker sits on the edges of the anonymity system viewing
it as a black box and tries to correlate traffic in order to identify all the peers of a
particular user. The attack was first proposed by Kesdogan et al. [87] and further
refined by Agrawal et al. [4, 5]. The disclosure is a NP-complete problem and therefore
computationally exhausting, which led to a proposal for a statistical disclosure attack [35].
The statistical disclosure attack is further refined by Danezis and Serjantov [36], as well
as by Mathewson and Dingledine [99]. The results of the analysis of the predecessor and
disclosure attacks showed that long-term communications cannot be protected by known
anonymity systems.
Finally, we note that in practice, anonymity and privacy-preserving systems can be
compromised in many ways. Thus, even though the users would be using the anonymity
systems presented above to protect their identity (IP address), many other attacks are
possible. Authorship analysis [108, 116] can be used to find the author from writings
done under a pseudonym. Cookies [95] can also be used to subvert anonymous systems
as well as bringing with them privacy issues of their own. A server can plant a cookie to
track the user, and therefore an anonymity system needs also to filter the Web traffic.
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2.3 Privacy in Wireless Networks and Mobile Systems
The previous sections reviewed fundamental building blocks for the confidentiality of
communication content and anonymity systems on the Internet. In this section, however,
we give the background on privacy enhancing technologies in wireless networks and
mobile systems. Privacy protection in mobile and wireless systems can be investigated
from the viewpoint of confidentiality of communication content, confidentiality of
communication participants and location privacy as discussed already in the Introduction
chapter. Below, we emphasize WLAN and related technologies because of the focus of
this thesis.
2.3.1 Confidentiality of Communication Content
In this section, we review the link-layer security development for wireless local area
networks and other common mechanisms for protecting WLANs. This is the most
common challenge to privacy in wireless networks. We discuss another common problem:
the privacy of location later in Section 2.3.2. To start with, however, we focus on the
problems with the first hop: the wireless medium between a client and an access point.
End-to-end security is also an important problem for wireless networks although it is
orthogonal to the solutions presented below. End-to-end encryption is usually provided
by the solutions presented in Section 2.1.2.
Link-layer security The earliest work known to the author on security of wireless
local area networks dates back to 1994. Aziz and Diffie propose a link-layer protocol for
“privacy and authentication” [14] that uses public key certificates for authentication and
also shared key primitives in subsequent encrypted communication. The authors also
provide proofs of the protocol based on BAN logic for authentication [24].
In 1997, the first version of IEEE 802.11 WLAN was standardized [73]. The physical
andMAC layer specifications also contained a security protocol calledWired Equivalence
Privacy (WEP), which later became infamous for its lack of security. WEP, however,
provided a convenient way to configure the network security with the “Shared Key”. The
other option was to use “Open System” meaning no encryption on the link-layer. WEP
later was found to be flawed [23, 48, 130], and finally in 2006 the numerous patches (e.g.
re-keying) for it were also proven to be completely insufficient [20].
The flaws of WEP did not go unnoticed by the wireless industry and the Wi-Fi
Alliance [140] specified and implemented Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). WPA was
designed to be compatible with deployed hardware that supported WEP while the
IEEE standardized the replacement of WEP with IEEE 802.11i [74]. WPA could
be introduced to WLAN devices with firmware upgrades, while the IEEE 802.11i
was being standardized. An analysis of 802.11i [65, 66] found flaws that made the
protocol susceptible to denial of service attacks, and a corrected version was incorporated
into the final published protocol. Later, a formal correctness proof of 802.11i with
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) was presented [67]. The 2007 [76] version of 802.11
incorporated 802.11i [74], which was published separately in 2004.
One of the features that was introduced in the protocols succeeding WEP was the
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possibility to integrate the authentication with AAA systems and use the 802.1X port-
based access control [75]. These features enabled so-called managed networks that
can use considerable key lengths because users do not need to configure the WPA or
802.11i keys manually. These enterprise versions of the security protocols use Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [128] implementations, such as EAP-TLS [126].
Despite the efforts to secure WLAN, the usability of WLAN security was questioned
[50]. Users could not enable the link-layer encryption for their access points or were
using short keys that could be broken easily with dictionary-based attacks. Even
though WPA and 802.11i use PBKDF2 [82] to enhance the security of passwords, very
simple passwords could still be cracked. (The usefulness of PBKDF2 implementation
was also questioned [148].) To address the usability problems of WLAN security
setup, the Wi-Fi alliance published Wi-Fi protected setup (WPS) [141] specification.
Unfortunately, the usability of WPS specifications was found to be poor [96], and
even the certified implementations have therefore varied in functionality. It is worth
noting that, independent of the Wi-Fi alliance, setting up WLAN security using location
limited channels was proposed in “Network-in-a-Box” [16]. Because enabling link-layer
security was problematic for users, or the hardware was insufficient to support enhanced
protocols, or some networks do not deploy link-layer security, a number of other security
practices have emerged. We describe these practices next.
Other WLAN protection mechanisms We now describe security mechanisms that
are not specified by the IEEE 802.11 standards, but are deployed widely.
One widely recommended [53, 120, 129, 142] security measure is to disable SSID
broadcasting in WLAN. Disabling the broadcasting means that instead of a user-readable
name, the WLAN beacons contain an empty string. Thus, the access point’s presence
can still be spotted from the beacons. To gain access to the network, the client must
actively send probe requests for the hidden name, and when the access point is present,
it will reply with the probe response. This mechanism introduces a problem for client
privacy, first recognized by Greenstein et al. [57], and is further discussed below.
Another common mechanism for securing an access point is MAC address filtering.
The access point is configured with an access control list, and only clients with
preconfigured MAC addresses are allowed to connect. The non-broadcast SSID and
MAC address filtering mechanisms only offer protection from possible casual network
intruders. Determined attackers merely need to be present and passively observing when
the hidden network with MAC address filtering is accessed, and they can then easily
configure appropriate parameters for their attacking clients.
The final non-standard mechanism, which is widely deployed, is HTTP authentication
or web browser based authentication, also known as Universal Access Method (UAM).
To gain access to the WLAN network, the users launch their web browser. The web
browser is redirected by the DNS server to an authentication page, where the users can
give their credentials, that is, username and password. This mechanism is convenient
for service providers since it provides the possibility of roaming by using AAA servers,
such as RADIUS. Further, if used with pre-paid credentials, UAM also provides for
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anonymous access. The downside of the method is that usually no link-layer encryption
is used in combination. Thus, if users’ applications do not encrypt traffic, everything is
freely observable by anybody in the proximity of the access point. Some organizations
have deployed non-universal methods, such as the use of TLS or IPsec VPN clients for
protecting the traffic at the access link.
2.3.2 Location Privacy
Anonymity and location privacy are overlapping concepts, but we can distinguish them as
follows: we mean with location privacy that the location of an entity is hidden and with
anonymity that the identity of an entity in a location is hidden. The overlap comes from
the fact that many anonymity systems discussed in Section 2.2 provide both properties.
The location privacy problem was mentioned already in 1993 in a CACM review
article: “a key problem with ubiquitous computing is preserving privacy of location”
[138]. The author of the article briefly discusses their transition from centralized location
databases with unrestricted access to individual access control in ubiquitous location
based applications.
Roaming Networks and Location Based Services Early work on location privacy of
mobile computers was theoretical in nature. Cooper and Birman [33] proposed a system
model where the mobile computers would communicate via a message server. The
mobile computers communicate by assigning labels on the message server. Anonymity
by “blinded read” operations: attackers cannot determine the location of the mobile
node, because they do not know what position of the shared memory of the message
server is currently being read. The blind read resembles what is today known as Private
Information Retrieval [110].
Other early theoretical work [10, 123] focused on protecting the privacy of the
authentication in a network model similar to GSM: how to protect the privacy of the
mobile user when the mobile client needs to be authenticated in the visiting network?
The location privacy problem in cellular networks is related to recent interest in
privacy protection in Location Based Services (LBS) [19, 34, 47, 52, 60, 70, 149]. These
systems and protocols are important, but beyond the scope of this thesis, since our focus
is on privacy problems that occur without the availability of any explicit location based
service.
Identifiers in Networking Protocols Network protocols on all layers of the protocol
stack use identifiers for establishing and multiplexing connections. Unfortunately, these
identifiers introduce privacy problems. The identifiers might not directly reveal the
identity of the communication participants, but persistent identifiers can be used to
(re)locate the users. The attacker tries to find answers to questions such as: “Did this
traffic sample come from device D?”
The first deployed wireless network location privacy mechanism is in the GSM
networks according to Samfat et al. [123]. The mechanism is, however, flawed. The
mobile phones used pseudonyms called Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (TMSI)
in communication with the access points. However, when the users turn on the mobile
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phone, their identities are revealed in the form of International Mobile Subscriber
Identifier (IMSI), and TMSI is allocated after that. Thus, an attacker could correlate
IMSIs to TMSIs. The mobile phone is also forced to send the IMSI if the synchronization
of TMSI between the phone and the home network is lost.
In WLAN networks it was first noted that the 48-bit 802 MAC address [72] can
be used for tracking wireless devices [61,62]. Similar issues were found in Bluetooth
[78, 143], in RFID [80], in early versions of the upcoming Bluetooth replacement
Wibree [46,71], and even in special appliances, such as Nike and IPod Sports kit [124].
The main differences between the technologies were that in some of them the addresses
might be changed periodically. However, the change of the identifiers was usually done
in a predictable manner, before proposals to change the mechanisms were introduced
[46, 143].
Unfortunately, the trivially observable hardware address is not the only problem at
the WLAN MAC layer. WLAN networks are discovered either by periodic beacons
broadcast by the access point or active probing by clients. The beacons and probes
contain human-readable network names called SSIDs. The probing of the SSIDs presents
a problem for user privacy [57, 112]. First of all, the broadcast SSIDs are highly
likely [112] to present a unique fingerprint of the user. Second, they also tell in plaintext
the history of network service usage of the user, that is, the networks the user has been
visiting. Interestingly, the timings of the probe requests can be used to identify the
device driver of the 802.11 interface [49] or even to differentiate clients using the same
operating system and device drivers [38].
Similar problems with identifier usage also exist when we go up in the protocol stack.
The IPv6 [37] addressing architecture [69] allows hosts to configure their addresses
automatically without involving a server. The original specifications [134] of the IPv6
stateless address autoconfiguration created a lot of controversy. The host could choose
the interface identifier portion of the address by using the EUI-64 encoding of the MAC
address. Creating the address this way meant that there would be a persistent unique
identifier for the host wherever it might travel. This would have made the privacy of the
mobile user much worse compared to the situation with the current Internet Protocol
(IPv4) [115]. The privacy problem was fixed five years later in privacy extensions for the
IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration [106] while the autoconfiguration mechanism
specification was also updated. The privacy extensions provided a way to choose the
interface identifier in random. However, Escudero-Pascual [47] argues that the privacy
extensions present another kind of problem for privacy, because an attacker can observe
that the privacy extensions are used: it might be interesting in some situations to see
which of the clients are to keep hidden from observation. It should be also noted that
even the current specifications [135] of the IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration today
allow it to be implemented without the corresponding updated [107] privacy extensions.
Interestingly, the use of IP addresses as Home Address or Care of Address in Mobile IP
and Mobile IPv6 can also introduce location privacy problems [47,91] and, for example,
the security design of IPv6 did not even consider the location privacy [11]. Finally, even
30
the IPsec architecture ESP [85] uses identifiers called SPIs that can be used to identify
the mobile host, although not persistently [8].
Even application layer identifiers (or names) can be harmful for the location privacy
of the user. The user names used in the Session Initiation Protocol [122], which is
used for VoIP signaling, for example, can be used to identify the mobile host and the
user. Further, it has been shown that dynamic DNS is a very effective way to track
the user remotely [63]. Dynamic DNS servers allow the user to register their current
IP address for a particular domain name. This enables the users to be reachable with
a human-readable name, even though they would be changing their places, and thus,
frequently networks and IP addresses. Unfortunately, the IP addresses can be effectively
mapped with geolocation services and researchers have even developed an automatic
tool for dynamic DNS-based tracking [63].
Fingerprinting Techniques Above, we presented location privacy problems related
to the use of identifiers at different layers of the protocol stack. We now examine ways
to identify a mobile client in some other, usually non-obvious, ways. These techniques
are generally known as fingerprinting, and can be passive or active.
Starting again from the lowest layers of the protocol stack, RF fingerprinting for
Ethernet [54], and as noted above, probe-request-based device driver fingerprinting for
802.11 [49] can be used. The probe requests can also be used to fingerprint unique clients
that use the same operating system and device drivers [38]. The time of transmission
and the signal strength can also be used to identify the mobile node [79], and so can
broadcast packet sizes and MAC protocol fields, such as ‘more fragments’, ‘retry’ and
the supported authentication algorithms [112].
There are many approaches available that can fingerprint the operating system with
active scanning. A recent proposal [59] uses TCP SYN packets to open ports and tries
to remain undetected. In “remote physical device fingerprinting” [88, 89], the authors
use the TCP timestamps to passively observe the clock skew of remote clients and
consequently identify the exact client device.
We also observed during our work that censorship-resistance techniques are related
to location privacy in a way that perhaps is not obvious. For example, Tor [44] provides
in practice good sender and receiver anonymity, given the limitations discussed before.
However, it is somewhat easy to spot the use of Tor in the local network. For example,
today, Tor clients usually connect to a small number of guard nodes, which already
makes the user identifiable because of the persistent destination IP addresses. This is,
in fact, similar to the problem of broadcast SSIDs above. Therefore, even though Tor
provides identity and location privacy on the Internet, it may harm the location privacy
in the local wireless network where the client resides.
Privacy Protection Mechanisms Above, we have explained how the location privacy
of a mobile client can be compromised with the use of identifiers. This section presents
some techniques that mitigate possible attack vectors.
Gruteser and Grunwald proposed MAC address randomization and also quantified
how well the user can be tracked despite the MAC address changes [61, 62]. Their
31
approach assumed that the client itself would change the address. Later, Jiang et al. [79]
proposed that the access point could assign the pseudonymous MAC addresses. However,
these proposals themselves neither cover the question of client mobility nor take into
consideration the MAC address changes regarding network connectivity.
Concerning the issue of the WLAN MAC layer, Tryst implements confidential
discovery of access points [58,113]. The approach is clean-slate and is combined with
SlyFi [58] - an identifier-free link layer, which solves most of the identifier related
problems at the MAC layer. However, the approach has some practical implementation
issues such as the requirement of synchronized clocks, and does not follow the IEEE
802.11 standard.
To mitigate tracking based on radio signals Li et al. [98] proposed Swing & Swap.
They provide analytical and simulation details for the applicability of their approach, but
no implementation details are given. In Swing, a wireless node broadcasts an identifier
update, and is silent for a random period. In Swap, local mobile nodes are solicited to
exchange identifiers with the mobile node. The authors do not consider how connectivity
with this approach is maintained. Jiang et al. [79] opportunistically attenuated the
transmission power of the wireless interface to make it more difficult for the attacker
to track the device by measuring the received signal strength of the radio interface, and
they provided experimental data on the applicability of their approach.
Moving up the stack, we could use the anonymity systems presented in Section 2.2 to
protect the privacy of the user. There are also other kinds of practical, but limited,
mechanisms that provide additional privacy for mobile users without the need for
infrastructure support. For example, Aura & Zugenmaier [13] proposed that the mobile
host should acquire a new IPv6 address for every new TCP flow. This introduces the
equivalent privacy for IPv6 that the Network Address Translation provides for IPv4.
2.4 Summary
So far we have presented related work on privacy enhancing technologies while focusing
on the scope of this thesis. We started our discussion with cryptographic building blocks
and introduced some elementary protocols that employ similar techniques that are used in
modern authentication and key exchange protocols on the Internet. We also looked into
the identity protection mechanisms in these protocols. Anonymity systems and practical
privacy protection mechanisms on the Internet and their limitations followed. Finally,
we discussed security and location privacy mechanisms in mobile systems, the topic of
this thesis. The next chapter deals with the practical privacy enhancing technologies we
propose in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
Practical Privacy Enhancing
Technologies
In this chapter, we further discuss the contributions of this thesis, and highlight the
benefits and the known limitations of the proposed privacy enhancing technologies. We
also contrast the contributions with the main related work and also with recent results.
The chapter is organized as follows. We first discuss the systematic analysis of privacy
leaks presented in Publication II, and then the proposed privacy preserving mechanisms
starting from the first publication and continue with a discussion how the subsequent
publications complement our earlier work. Together, the separate contributions help to
realize the aim of a privacy-preserving mobile computer.
Publication I discussed in Section 3.2 presents how to leverage a secure mobility
management protocol for changing identifiers in the protocol stack to provide privacy
and seamless connectivity. Lessons learned from the analysis of privacy leaks presented
in Publication II led us to propose a policy for mitigating these leaks, also presented in
the same publication and summarized in Section 3.3. The lessons learned also lead us
to adopt a pessimistic view of mobile user privacy, since we realized just how vast the
amount of leaks were not prevented in the system proposed in Publication I. The approach
of Publication I was further refined with the concept of protocol stack virtualization in
Publication III discussed in Section 3.4. These approaches unfortunately do not help to
mitigate the leaks present in the MAC layer of IEEE 802.11 in access-point discovery.
This lead to the work presented in Publication IV and discussed in Section 3.5.
The presented contributions are summarized in the conclusion of this chapter. At the
same time the engineering principles applied in this work and the lessons learned are
discussed. The chapter ends with considerations for further work.
3.1 Analysis of Privacy Leaks
In Publication II, we uncovered a number of leaks from modern mobile computers:
Windows XP and Windows Vista laptops. As already discussed in the Background
chapter, many leaks have been separately reported before, whereas our main contribution
was the systematic analysis of the leaks at all layers of the protocol stack. To accomplish
the analysis, we implemented software that:
1. gathered potentially personally identifiable information from the user’s computer,
2. used the gathered information for searching captured traffic logs,
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Protocol Leaks Layer
Application Metadata various leaks, e.g. instant
messaging
application
DNS DNS queries, resolving pri-
vate names and default suf-
fixes
application
NetBIOS NetBIOS lookup and WINS
registration
application
LLMNR LLMNR name resolution application
DHCP host identification and DNS
registration
application
Domain Controller LDAP queries in addition to
DNS
application
File shares and printers mounted network drives,
shortcuts to network shares
and printer discovery
application
IKE IKE with GSSAPI IP
TLS plaintext certificates in VPN transport
EAP-TLS client and server certificates transport
Table 3.1: Overview of the uncovered privacy leaks
3. and integrated the tools with Microsoft Netmon 3 for manual analysis.
Due to space limitations, we did not report full details of all the leaks uncovered
during the analysis in Publication II. Next, we briefly summarize the uncovered leaks in
the following order: service or resource discovery, cryptographic authentication and key
exchange protocols and application metadata. We end this section with information we
discovered on the recommended use of default suffixes.
Many of the leaks were related to unsuccessful service or resource discovery attempts,
such as the use of DNS, Netbios, DHCP, mounted network drives and the discovery
of printers. An interesting open problem we discovered is ad hoc service discovery,
exemplified by the iTunes media player. When two or more previously unknown devices
rendezvous, there is no easy way to discover them and preserve privacy, while giving the
users meaningful names for the devices. The approach adopted by Apple has interesting
consequences: iTunes broadcasts the username and the host name to the network. In
the case of the author of this thesis, iTunes broadcasts “janne @ Janne Lindqvist’s
computer”, because the author was asked the full name when he first started to use the
computer.
Other interesting leaks were related to the use of names in cryptographic authen-
tication protocols: the client and domain name are leaked from IKE with GSSAPI
authentication, and plaintext certificates are leaked from TLS-based virtual private
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networks and from EAP-TLS used in managed 802.11 based wireless networks.
Fortunately, a new specification for the EAP-TLS authentication protocol published in
March 2008 adds client privacy protection [126].
We did not elaborate much on application layer leaks in Publication II. We would
like to note in this connection that the availability of many personalized services
renders privacy protection against passive observers on the local link a demanding
task. The problem lies in the fact that the service providers usually have cryptographic
authentication for the service, but for the remainder of the session, the data is transmitted
in plaintext. This is the case for many instant messengers and web-based services
such as online social networks, email, blogs and web searching. Also, browser
toolbars conveniently transmit plaintext information about the user. Interestingly,
some personalized services that do not require (strong) authentication until subsequent
purchases reveal the user identity, because they authenticate the user with cookies stored
in the client operating system. The use of cookies is a known privacy problem [95]
that has been studied before, and it additionally makes the user vulnerable to passive
observers because of greetings along the lines of “Hello Janne, we have recommendations
for you...”. This privacy problem could be prevented by also encrypting the session
traffic data. Unfortunately, many service providers do not have the economic incentives
to do that. Some providers do, however, encrypt the session data, too. For example,
with Google Mail, the user can optionally choose to encrypt the whole Mail session
with TLS. However, since the same account is used for different services, which are not
encrypted with TLS, the user identity (e.g. firstname.lastname@gmail.com) is revealed
as plaintext when using Google Search while logged in to the Mail service. We would
like to emphasize that we use Google Mail and Search merely to exemplify why solving
the information leakage is a difficult problem.
The final remark we make on the information leak analysis is the use of default
suffixes. For example, when the user accesses http://www.tkk.fi, the www.tkk.fi domain
name can be appended with a default suffix (e.g. sales.contoso.com) to form the
name www.tkk.fi.sales.contoso.com. Recently, we discovered that there is already
an Informational RFC [51] published in 1993 that recommends not using search path or
at least restricting it to local domains. Careless appending of domain names introduces a
security risk that can be used to capture connections.
Limitations of the Privacy Leak Analysis The completeness of the analysis can be
questioned for two reasons. First, the used method is at best heuristic: we cannot know
how many of the possible leaks we were able to capture. We did not capture encrypted or
obfuscated traffic (Skype is an excellent example of encrypted and obfuscated traffic [22]).
We supported only ASCII, Unicode UTF-8, UTF16 in big- and little-endian byte order,
UTF32, and NetBIOS encoding. We did not implement support for other encodings,
such as Base64 and uuencode.
The second obvious limitation of the analysis is that we used only Windows XP
and Windows Vista operating systems in the analysis. Common operating systems,
such as Mac OS X and Linux, were not included in the analysis. As an anonymous
35
reviewer of the publication noted, it would be also interesting to apply the tool to various
WLAN-enabled devices and entertainment devices, such as mp3 players. In fact, some
related leaks from entertainment devices have been reported, for example, from the
Nike+iPod sports kit [124].
Recently, after our work was published, work with similar goals was published.
Privacy Oracle [81] detects leaks using “black-box differential fuzz testing”: applications
are given variable inputs (e.g. for username bob and alice), and network traces are
compared for the differences. In contrast to our work, Privacy Oracle can even detect
hashed usernames, while we detect identifiers that were explicitly available on the user’s
computer. However, Privacy Oracle requires setting up the test separately for every
application to be tested, whereas we can gather the identifiers in one run and analyze
network traces from ordinary computer usage.
The systematic analysis of the leaks was crucial in understanding the limitations of
the following privacy-preserving mechanisms that follow. We hope that the work will
have an impact on the overall awareness on mobile computer user privacy.
3.2 Privacy Management for Secure Mobility
The privacy management for secure mobility marked the launch of the author’s privacy
research. The work for Publication I started from the observation that the use of Host
Identifiers in the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [104] can introduce privacy violations
for both identity and location. In this context, the identity means the mobile system,
which could be used further to identify the mobile user. The location means the
physical location, e.g. the access point location, since the network location will
in any case be revealed because of the network-prefix in IPv6 address. The HIP
architecture [103] basically proposes two kinds of identifiers, long-lasting public and
temporary “anonymous”. The identifiers are public/private key pairs and hashes of
the public keys are used in the protocol messages. However, neither the Host Identity
Protocol nor the architecture specifies how to manage the use of these identifiers; neither
does the HIP “native API” [90]. Thus, anonymous and public identifiers might be used
at the same time, and only one of the identifiers needs to be public for the anonymity of
all other identifiers to be immediately compromised. Similar problems exist with other
protocols and privacy architectures (e.g. SIP [122]). Additionally, the privacy of the
identifiers can be compromised if any inbound connections use public identifiers. One of
the obvious ways how all these identifiers can be linked together is the hardware MAC
address. Thus, the operating system needs to make sure that these kind of identifiers are
not used at the same time.
We did not limit ourselves to the management of public and anonymous identifiers,
although it was one of the more important aspects of the work. We also wanted to
provide privacy-preserving seamless mobility meaning that even though a mobile system
needs to use some (implicit) identifiers, such as MAC and IP addresses, the connections
should not be severed when using changing pseudorandom identifiers. Previous work
had proposed using pseudorandom MAC addresses [61, 62], which would have resulted
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in severed connections. Instead of focusing on a single layer, however, we decided to
consider all layers of the protocol stack. Independently, the use of shared pseudorandom
sequences for all layers of protocol stack had been proposed [8]. But in contrast to this
proposal, it was only necessary to change the MAC and IP addresses (and possibly the
used keys) from time to time, for example, when changing the access point. The transport
and application layer traffic is protected with IPsec ESP provided by HIP. Furthermore,
with implementation experience, we showed that our approach works, whereas the
previous independent proposal [8] did not contain implementation experience.
In hindsight, the privacy management system should have been implemented on SSH
and TLS, and for mobility we could have used resilient SSH and TLS connections [92].
This would have made the approach much more deployable, since HIP itself is not
essential for the approach to work, only the ability to encrypt transport and application
layer traffic. However, since the authors were involved in a HIP project, their thinking
was naturally directed towards improving the HIP implementation.
Limitations of the Approach The first unfortunate limitation of the approach is
related to deployability. There are practically no incentives for server operators to
deploy the proposed mechanism. A similar problem exists with the use of end-to-end
encryption (even for TLS) for protecting session data. It is more cost-effective to only
use cryptographic protection in the authentication process, compared to encrypting the
whole session. Service providers lack an economic incentive for protecting the session,
because they are not responsible for the potential loss of privacy. If service providers
started to provide TLS protection for whole sessions, then they might get interested in
providing support for privacy management too. Reimplementing the approach in a way
that would not affect server performance substantially might motivate service providers
to implement the approach as a sign of good will. The author of this thesis currently
believes that there are not enough incentives to deploy HIP on client or server side.
The possibility to observe the services the users contact limits the privacy protection
provided by the approach. For example, the users might contact the web or email servers
of the organization they represent. A study [112] using 802.11 network traces from
SIGCOMM 2004, and one day of all traffic from U.C. San Diego’s CS building reported
that, on average, 60 % of the users (with false positive rate of 0.01) could be identified
by their use of destination IP addresses alone. A further limitation of the approach is
that many of the leaks covered by our analysis in Publication II cannot be protected
with the use of end-to-end encryption only. Thus, even though the MAC addresses and
IP addresses could be changed, the DHCP and WLAN interface might still broadcast
enough information for identifying the mobile node.
3.3 Network Location Awareness Based Privacy Policy
To prevent the various leaks we analyzed in Publication II, we also proposed a new
privacy policy for (mobile) operating systems:
“When client software stores information about an online service for the
purpose of connecting to it later, it must also store the NLA network
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identifiers of the access links where the service is known to be accessible.
Automatic connection attempts to the service are only allowed on those
networks.”
Or more succinctly:
Automatically connect to a service only in networks where the service is
known to exists.
The idea behind the policy is simply to identify previously visited networks and
control the use of networked applications based on the settings for that particular network.
The key observation behind this policy proposal was that many of the leaks were the
results of unsuccessful service discovery attempts. In Publication II, we briefly discuss
what needs to be considered when implementing the policy using, for example, network
location awareness services in Windows Vista. However, we did not implement the
mechanism. Thus, it remains to be seen how good the proposed policy would be in
practice. We further note that the policy does not prevent application layer leaks.
There are other alternatives to the proposed policy that were not discussed in
Publication II. In the next paragraphs, we summarize these alternatives. To begin
with, we could think of a statistical protection mechanism, that is, using the network
connection only when it is needed. Unfortunately, this kind of approach is at best
heuristic, and thus, brittle and can have adverse effects on user experience. Similarly, we
could think of disabling all automatic service discovery. This approach would not only
make the user experience bad, but would only solve the problems related to the service
discovery. For similar reasons, manual configuration for each network would not work.
It might also be thought that the users could tunnel everything through a VPN. This
is feasible for most protocols, but not for the basic service discovery protocols such
as DHCP or printer discovery. Further, it is highly likely that the VPN server would
introduce a new very distinct identifier for the users and their affiliations: the domain
name and the IP address of the VPN server. These identifiers would persist for the
user network to network, similar to the default IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration
interface identifier based on a hardware address. Instead of a fixed VPN server (or server
farm), the mobile host could be configured to use deployed anonymity networks, such
as Tor by default, but this would harm the user experience because of the latency these
networks introduce, and might also produce a distinct identifier as will be discussed later
in Section 3.8.
The above work is closely related to a proposal for secure NLA [12]. Secure NLA
adds public key authentication to DHCP messages for providing a simple and efficient
way to detect previously visited networks. The authors of the secure NLA designed the
protocol to preserve client privacy. However, implementing the proposed privacy policy
should not require secure NLA. To succeed in falsifying the location, the attacker needs
a considerable amount of information from the networks that the potential victims visits.
Therefore, the privacy policy should be able to be implemented by modifying only the
client operating system.
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Limitations The proposed policy has not been implemented, and thus our analysis
of it is at best an educated guess. The policy should not impact user experience, if we
assume that the user is familiar with the NLA mechanism already. Implementation of
the policy is not trivial since we need to ensure that user experience is not affected.
However, at this point, we cannot know the tradeoffs that the implementation would
introduce to the mobile system. Therefore, implementing the policy would be worth
further work. The implementation should be designed not to assume anything about the
deployed networks, and not to impact in any way corporate network design. Otherwise,
it is unlikely that it will be taken into use. There are also some subtleties that we did not
discuss in Publication II. For example, leaking the corporate default home page can be
as harmful as leaking the local DNS suffixes. Fortunately, both can be controlled and set
accordingly.
3.4 Protocol Stack Virtualization
The privacy protection mechanisms discussed above do not completely prevent
application layer leakage by protocol metadata or Web page access, for example.
Although encrypting payload data as suggested above would help, it is not feasible to
assume that this would happen in all possible cases. Thus, in Publication III, we adopted
a very pessimistic view of user privacy: leaks will happen. We then asked the question
how these leaks, especially the application layer leaks, could be mitigated by modifying
only the client and without changing the user experience at all. This work continues the
line of thinking presented in Publication I; we again use pseudorandom identifiers in
the protocol stack, but this time we modify only a single host. In essence, the system
provides traffic isolation. For example, different applications using the network can
seem to be different hosts because they have different MAC addresses and IP addresses.
Protocol stack virtualization was designed not to rely on the NLA privacy policy, and is
independent of it. Still, protocol stack virtualization is complementary with NLA and the
privacy management approach presented above. Moreover, the virtualization approach
addresses some leaks those approaches cannot cover.
Independently, a similar approach called FLASCHE [150] had been proposed for
mobile user privacy. FLASCHE proposed to use “location addresses”. In other words,
the address of the mobile host would be tied to a location and clients in the same
location would be distinguished by a random part in the address. The implementation
of FLASCHE was limited to HTTP at the application layer, and to IEEE 802.11b at
the link layer. In contrast to this, we decided from the beginning to support all possible
applications and legacy operating systems, and thus implemented the approach akin to a
host-based network address translator. We showed that our approach worked with all of
the varying legacy applications we tried, and further, we showed that user experience
was not affected by the approach, even in IPv4 networks.
One question that remains to be answered is the amount of improvement in privacy
provided by the approach. We did not try to quantify it, and exact quantification might
not even be feasible.
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3.5 Privacy-Preserving 802.11 Access-Point Discovery
Discussions of privacy problems in personal area networks, such as Wibree, were the
inspiration for this work. However, we moved our focus to IEEE 802.11 WLAN since
it has been successfully deployed all around the world, and the Wibree is still waiting
to be launched. Our initial goal was to solve the privacy problems created by the
disabling of the SSID broadcast without re-enabling it. This section highlights a problem
that can not be solved by any of the other privacy protection mechanisms discussed
above alone. In the current IEEE 802.11 [76] protocol, enabling the SSID broadcast
is unacceptable for some network owners, yet disabling the broadcast creates much
more serious privacy issues for the clients. We present a system that preserves all the
advantages of hidden networks, that is, the SSID broadcast can be disabled, while the
system provides stronger privacy protection for the clients than the existing alternatives.
In other words, our protocol is a win-win solution that does not require the network
administrators to choose between protecting the network or the clients. In fact, we end
up with slightly better privacy and security for the network, and also a more efficient
hidden network discovery than in the current legacy implementations. The contributions
of the work in Publication IV include the following: analysis of the privacy issues in
WLAN that had been presented in previous work, analysis of previous work on private
identification, design requirements, a system-centred protocol design, implementation,
overhead measurements, formal verification of the security and privacy properties of the
protocol.
The SSID broadcast problem was addressed by Tryst [58, 113] and SlyFi [58].
However, the authors of Tryst and SlyFi opted for a clean-slate design that replaced the
whole protocol stack, whereas we desired deployability requiring integration with the
standard IEEE 802.11 from the beginning.
Limitations The major limitation we see in our approach is that it requires a shared
key between the network and the client. As a positive side of the limitation, the user
experience and configuration does not change for networks protecting the link-layer
with, for example, WPA-PSK. In contrast, for managed networks using, for example
EAP-TLS authentication, a shared key is needed in addition to the other parameters
EAP-TLS provides. We have left the bootstrapping in managed networks as an open
problem. Further, the authentication used in managed networks at least reveals the server
certificates. However, this does not introduce a problem for client privacy. We could
prevent the leakage of certificates during the EAP-TLS authentication by encrypting it
with the shared key, but this would mean more radical changes to the standard IEEE
802.11 protocol.
Finally, as with any security technology it is not useful if there are no users for the
technology. For example, if nobody else other than you uses encryption software, it is
not useful to encrypt your email. Similarly, a privacy-preserving access-point discovery
is not useful, if access-point owners do not deploy it.
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3.6 Summary of Contributions
The contributions presented above complement each other in the quest of implementing
a privacy-preserving mobile computer. We first discussed the information leaks
from modern mobile operating systems, and how these leaks affect the identity and
organizational privacy of the user. The analysis of the leaks was crucial in understanding
the limitations of our privacy protection proposals. Then, we discussed different
but complementing approaches starting from the earliest publication of the author.
The management of identifiers on all layers of the protocol stack, a privacy policy
using network location awareness and protocol stack virtualization all provide privacy
without affecting the user experience, but with different deployability obstacles. Finally,
we presented privacy-preserving 802.11 access-point discovery, which is crucial for
preventing trivial user profiling in WLAN networks.
3.7 Engineering Principles and Lessons Learned
We started this work advocating the position that privacy needs to be considered from
the system viewpoint, especially when enhancing the privacy of legacy systems. We did
not know from the beginning how right we were in taking this viewpoint, and how many
lessons we would need to learn in the process.
In designing the privacy-preserving mechanisms, we have followed an approach
that is more common in systems research than in systems security research. Instead
of proposing new systems from a clean-slate, we retrofitted security and privacy to
real-world systems used today.
In the security community, there lives a meme that security cannot be introduced to
a system after the design and implementation of the system. Instead, security design
should be integrated into the system design from the beginning. In practice, this kind of
integrated security design does not happen for real-world systems, the sole exception
being perhaps military-grade systems. Instead, when attacker models change or new
flaws are recovered, security must be designed after the system has been deployed.
In this thesis, we have followed the approach of viewing the mobile host as a system
that needs to be secured from information leaks that could be used to identity and locate
the user of the mobile system. We first thought that it was adequate to consider the mobile
system from the viewpoint of “all layers in the protocol stack”. After the systematic
analysis of privacy leaks, however, we understood that the approach alone was not at all
adequate.
System design is always about tradeoffs. Complete network security can be achieved
only by not connecting the computer to a network. And even then, the human factor
needs to be considered in order to ensure that nobody accidentally connects the computer
to the network. The tradeoffs we considered in this thesis were between user experience,
deployability, and security of the proposed approaches.
One of the key lessons learned from this work was from the design of the privacy-
preserving 802.11 access-point discovery. It was obvious that to cover the whole mobile
system, something needed to be done about the IEEE 802.11 access-point discovery,
41
in addition of course to the well-known problem of MAC address based identification
and tracking. When trying to ensure that the user experience does not change and that
our design would be deployable and would provide real security and privacy properties,
we discovered that protocol engineering is quite different from developing an abstract
secure protocol.
At some point in the work, we thought that changing the user experience would
facilitate the deployability of the protocol. The privacy-preserving discovery protocol
could work without using any name in configuring the network. However, during
discussions with usability and networking experts, we abandoned this track. The user
experience should not be changed in that way, since the networks in any case need to be
called something, that is, they need a name. User interface integration issues also came
up in the later stages of the implementation. When hidden networks are configured in the
client user interface, the user needs to specify the type of link-layer encryption used, e.g.,
WEP, WPA Personal, or WPA2 Enterprise. The used names may even vary somewhat
depending on the used operating system. Since the client operating system needs to
know during the configuration process whether it is configuring a legacy hidden network
or a secure hidden network established by our protocol, we need to add that information
to the configuration interface. The approach which seemed the most viable, but not
confirmed with usability tests, was to annotate the link-layer encryption descriptions.
For example, the user interface could say “WPA Personal + privacy discovery”. Another
option could have been to have the user click a button in the configuration interface “this
network is securely hidden”, but we thought that users might easily forget to click that
additional new button.
The other key lesson learnt during the work was that it is not enough to redesign
the access-point discovery to be correctly privacy-preserving. It is also relevant what
happens after the discovery procedure. Thus, we needed to look at all the protocol
messages that may be sent to the access network during the attachment procedure. Our
initial design might otherwise have been of little use, since after the discovery process,
the SSID would have been revealed. We had a formal proof of the initial design, which
showed that it was correct. Of course, we had not modeled the properties of the system
that we did not know about at that point.
Similarly to the 802.11 access-point discovery, the system aspects were a priority
when designing and implementing the protocol stack virtualization approach. It did
not suffice that we merely provided different address spaces for every flow. We needed
to consider how a mobile system is used in practice, since it involves DNS requests
and ARP queries as well, for example. This introduced complexity since we decided
we needed a transparent proxy for DNS to be able to filter the requests appropriately.
Similarly, for ARP, we needed a protocol helper to be able to map the requests correctly.
If these and other protocols had not been considered during the design, the protocol stack
virtualization would not have been of much use.
In summary, retrofitting privacy enhancements to already deployed systems is
possible, but takes considerable effort, even when the additions are simple and small. In
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that sense, the security community is right that security should be integrated to systems
from the beginning. The engineering work for privacy enhancement is analogous to
the advancement of cryptography. First, a flaw is discovered in a system or protocol.
If the flaw, the system, or the protocol is significant enough, solutions are proposed by
the community. The published solutions may contain further flaws and subsequently be
revised. However, in contrast to the systems community, formally proofing the design is
usually a requirement in the cryptographic community. We found this is also beneficial
in reducing obvious flaws in our protocol design. Unfortunately, not all aspects of the
system are amenable to proofs in practice. Thus, the iterative process of engineering is
needed when redesigning real-life systems.
3.8 Further Considerations
In this thesis, we set out to find the tradeoffs of mobile computer usage in relation
to privacy and to find out how to mitigate or prevent privacy leaks. We think we
have answered these research questions appropriately. As shown, even though our
analysis of privacy tradeoffs cannot be considered as complete, it was fundamental in
evolving our thinking on the problem space. Given the constraints we set for the work,
user experience and deployability, we believe that our design is practical enough to
be deployed. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether our designs will really be
deployed in real-networks, or whether the alternative clean-slate solutions are preferred,
for example, by standardization bodies. Next, we discuss some further work that we did
not answer in this thesis.
Most of the privacy enhancing technologies presented in this thesis make it actually
easier to notice the user in today’s networks. Especially in the case when the user is the
only one in the network using a particular mechanism; the mechanism is an anomaly in
the network traffic, and the user is therefore easier to spot. Thus, the location privacy
of the user is much easier to compromise. However, this is the situation for most
novel and practical privacy enhancing technologies. As discussed in the background
chapter, even Tor [44] can be harmful for location privacy despite the fact it provides
sender-receiver anonymity. In a wireless network, the users that are using Tor can
be more easily distinguished from other users. Clearly, further work is warranted in
analyzing techniques that could allow the user to blend into crowds in current networks,
even though nobody else might be using similar mechanisms. The implementation
of the NLA-based privacy policy could be one example. Maybe only MAC address
randomization at some intervals would in the final analysis serve to be indistinguishable
from other network traffic.
It is interesting that this work highlights the differences between using open networks
and closed networks. An attacker in GPRS networks, for example, needs much more
effort to detect leaks similar to the ones we uncovered in Publication II, compared to the
situation of using WLAN. The disadvantage is that the location privacy in relation to the
service provider is automatically lost in closed networks, such as GPRS.
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As further work, it would also be interesting to quantify how large the network has to
be to gain the benefits of many of the approaches when the client is mobile. For example,
if protocol stack virtualization is used, and the client switches the access point, all the
identifiers appear simultaneously in the new access point. This information could be
used to reveal clients that are using the protocol stack virtualization.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
Privacy is at stake today. Many western societies could almost be called surveillance
societies. Surveillance cameras are becoming more and more common, and an increasing
number of countries grant some of their governmental agencies the right to observe and
retain all communication traffic traversing their country. Even some governments, which
have democratically elected representatives, spy on their own citizens in “the war against
terrorism”, and anti-piracy organizations are given access to log files of popular services
in the quest to reveal illegal distribution of copyrighted material.
In this thesis, we have focused on protecting the users of wireless mobile networks
from much more resource-constrained attackers than governmental agencies. We were
not interested in a potentially omnipresent attacker; instead we were concerned about
the passive observer in the local link or a few hops away. We have shown that even
this kind of attacker with very limited resources, perhaps equipped only with a laptop,
can observe a considerable amount of personally identifiable information and implicit
information for identifying and tracking interesting targets. What the attacker can do
with the information varies, and can range from cyberstalking to targeting employees of
interesting organizations for physical attacks, such as stealing a laptop.
Many of the privacy problems we have discussed in this thesis are caused by
unsuccessful service discovery attempts and the use of explicit and implicit identifiers on
all layers of the protocol stack. We have presented mechanisms that prevent or mitigate
these leaks. None of the solutions presented in this thesis can accomplish much alone
to preserve the privacy of the user. However, the combination of these mechanisms is
essential for building a privacy-preserving mobile computer. When all of the mechanisms
are implemented in a mobile computer, the privacy of the user is clearly improved. In
fact everything we have proposed has been implemented in software and in a way that
does not affect the user experience at all.
Unfortunately, protecting privacy still requires the involvement of users, operating
systems and device manufacturers. For example, even though we can do a decent job
of protecting accidental leaks, we cannot prevent the users from explicitly identifying
themselves when they access a personalized web-based service. If service providers
have no incentives to provide end-to-end encryption, mobile user privacy will remain
insufficient due to the application layer plaintext leaks. This work shows that privacy-
preserving mobile computers need to consider the whole protocol stack, including
network attachment methods. Additionally, a cultural change in the way network-
enabled applications are developed might be needed in order to provide more complete
privacy protection mechanisms.
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Finally, this thesis highlights the fact that preserving the privacy of the user remains a
difficult problem. We have not built a perfect solution. Nevertheless, we have shown that
modifying a mobile host to be more privacy-preserving can be achieved with simple and
efficient methods. We think that the solutions presented in this thesis provide a baseline
for designing future wireless network standards and also provide much needed insight
into implementing privacy-preserving network-enabled applications and protocols.
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